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| 1971 || || Lichtenstein and Slovic study and experiment on the {{w|preference reversal}} inconsistency.<ref name="Atladóttir"/>
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| 1973 || || {{w|Hindsight bias}}. {{w|Baruch Fischhoff}} attends a seminar where {{w|Paul E. Meehl}} states an observation that clinicians often overestimate their ability to have foreseen the outcome of a particular case, as they claim to have known it all along.<ref name="Fischhoff 2007">{{cite journal | last1 = Fischhoff | first1 = B | year = 2007 | title = An early history of hindsight research | url = | journal = Social Cognition | volume = 25 | issue = | pages = 10–13 | doi = 10.1521/soco.2007.25.1.10 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.365.6826 }}</ref>
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| 1974 || || " One of the common heuristics used when making judgements is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, first described in 1974 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In this heuristic, when people estimate an unknown quantity (say, the length of the average American commute) they begin with an ‘anchor’ of information they do know (say, their own commute) and adjust until an acceptable value is reached. This anchor could be based on information given to a person (such as the advertised price of new car before bargaining) or it could be drawn from personal experience (the price a friend paid for a new car)."<ref name="One of the common">{{cite journal |last1=Ralph |first1=Kelcie |last2=Delbosc |first2=Alexa |title=I’m multimodal, aren’t you? How ego-centric anchoring biases experts’ perceptions of travel patterns |doi=10.1016/j.tra.2017.04.027 |url=One of the common heuristics used when making judgements is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, first described in 1974 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In this heuristic, when people estimate an unknown quantity (say, the length of the average American commute) they begin with an ‘anchor’ of information they do know (say, their own commute) and adjust until an acceptable value is reached. This anchor could be based on information given to a person (such as the advertised price of new car before bargaining) or it could be drawn from personal experience (the price a friend paid for a new car).}}</ref>
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| 1985 || || The {{w|disposition effect}} anomaly is identified and named by Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman. In their study, Shefrin and Statman note that "people dislike incurring losses much more than they enjoy making gains, and people are willing to gamble in the domain of losses." Consequently, "investors will hold onto stocks that have lost value...and will be eager to sell stocks that have risen in value." The researchers coined the term "disposition effect" to describe this tendency of holding on to losing stocks too long and to sell off well-performing stocks too readily. Shefrin colloquially described this as a "predisposition toward get-evenitis." John R. Nofsinger has called this sort of investment behavior as a product of the desire to avoid regret and seek pride.<ref name="Behavioural Finance">{{cite web|title=Disposition Effect|url=http://disposition-effect.behaviouralfinance.net/|website=Behavioural Finance|accessdate=11 January 2017|url-status=live|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170324030730/http://disposition-effect.behaviouralfinance.net/|archivedate=24 March 2017}}</ref>
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| 1985 || || The {{w|hot-hand fallacy}} is first described in a paper by {{w|Amos Tversky}}, {{w|Thomas Gilovich}}, and Robert Vallone.
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| 1989 || || The term "{{w|curse of knowledge}}" is coined in a ''{{w|Journal of Political Economy}}'' article by economists {{w|Colin Camerer}}, {{w|George Loewenstein}}, and Martin Weber.
