Timeline of gain-of-function research

From Timelines
Jump to navigation Jump to search

This is a timeline of gain-of-function research, documenting key scientific experiments, biosafety incidents, policy decisions, and public debates surrounding research that modifies pathogens to study transmissibility, virulence, and host range. It traces developments in virology, biosecurity governance, and ethical oversight from early influenza studies to contemporary controversies related to COVID-19 and pandemic preparedness.


Sample questions

The following are some interesting questions that can be answered by reading this timeline:

Big picture

Time period Development summary More details
2000–2010 Early scientific context and emergence of dual-use concerns Research on viral host range, pathogenesis, and cross-species transmission expands, including studies on influenza viruses. At the same time, international organizations and scientific bodies begin discussing the dual-use nature of life-science research and the potential security risks of experiments that could enhance pathogen capabilities.
2011–2013 Breakthrough experiments and beginning of global controversy Experiments by teams led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Ron Fouchier demonstrate that avian influenza H5N1 can be modified to transmit between mammals, triggering major scientific and political debates about biosafety, biosecurity, and publication of sensitive research.
2014–2015 Intensified debate, biosafety incidents, and regulatory responses Several laboratory safety incidents in the United States and high-profile policy debates lead to a U.S. moratorium on certain gain-of-function experiments. Scientific groups, policymakers, and international organizations publish reports and hold symposiums examining risks, benefits, and governance.
2016–2018 Development of oversight frameworks Governments and international organizations develop more formal oversight mechanisms, including recommendations from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and the U.S. Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) framework regulating research on potential pandemic pathogens.
2019–2022 Renewed scrutiny during the COVID-19 era Debate about gain-of-function research intensifies during investigations into the origins of SARS-CoV-2. Media coverage, congressional hearings, scientific analyses, and controversial experiments involving engineered viral variants renew global attention to biosafety, transparency, and governance of pathogen research.

Full timeline

Year Event type Details
2000 (May 12) Scientific publication A study reports the presence of influenza B virus in harbor seals, demonstrating cross-species infection and contributing to research on viral host range and pathogenesis.[1]
2010 (January 20) Policy report publication The American Association for the Advancement of Science publishes Competing Responsibilities?: Addressing the Security Risks of Biological Research in Academia, discussing governance challenges and public oversight in dual-use biological research.[2]
2010 International policy guidance The World Health Organization publishes non-binding guidance on dual-use research of concern (DURC), summarizing international approaches to oversight and recommending frameworks such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the International Health Regulations as reference points for national policy development.[3][4]
2011 (early) Reactions Proponents of the Kawaoka and Fouchier experiments argue that the research provides insights into how avian viruses could become airborne and facilitate the development of targeted vaccines and therapeutics. Critics, including some members of Congress, express concern over the risks, with some labeling the experiments as "engineered doomsday."
2011 (early) Experiments Two research groups, led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and Ron Fouchier at Erasmus University Medical Center, conducte experiments on avian influenza H5N1. They serially passage the virus in ferrets to study its potential for airborne transmission in humans. The modified virus, adapted to replicate in mammalian lungs, demonstrates the ability to spread via respiratory droplets but shows decreased lethality compared to its original form.
2011 Scientific experiment Two research groups led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and Ron Fouchier at Erasmus University Medical Center begin experiments investigating whether H5N1 avian influenza could evolve to transmit between mammals via respiratory droplets. The teams serially passage the virus in ferrets, producing mutations that enable airborne transmission in mammalian hosts.[5][6]
2012 (January 7) Public controversy An opinion article in The New York Times describes gain-of-function influenza experiments as potentially creating an "engineered doomsday", reflecting widespread public concern about biosafety and biosecurity risks.[7]
2012 (January) Review The WHO convenes an international technical consultation to evaluate the Kawaoka and Fouchier studies. The consultation acknowledges the importance of the research for public health surveillance and understanding H5N1 properties but calls for broader global discussions. The European Academies of Science Advisory Council (EASAC) confirms that existing regulations in the EU are adequate for conducting such research responsibly. In contrast, the US introduces a new policy for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) to regulate similar experiments.
2012 (February) International consultation The World Health Organization convenes an international technical consultation on H5N1 gain-of-function research. The meeting concludes that the experiments contribute to public health surveillance and understanding of influenza viruses but recommends broader global discussions on the risks and governance of such research.[8]
2012 (April) Scientific publication Research describing the pathogenicity and systemic spread of modified H5N1 influenza viruses in ferrets is published in the Journal of Virology, contributing to the scientific debate over gain-of-function influenza experiments.[6]
2012 Scientific publication A study led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka demonstrates that specific mutations in the hemagglutinin gene of H5 influenza viruses can enable respiratory droplet transmission in mammals, providing experimental evidence that avian influenza could evolve to spread among humans.[5]
2012 (June 22) Scientific publication A study led by Ron Fouchier reports airborne transmission of engineered H5N1 influenza between ferrets, intensifying global debate about gain-of-function experiments and biosafety risks.[9]
2012 (September) Scientific publication A paper in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism analyzes governance challenges surrounding the review and publication of dual-use research of concern (DURC), including biosecurity risks associated with life-science research.[10]
2013 Scientific analysis Researchers analyze H5N1 pathogenesis in mammalian models, including ferrets, helping evaluate the implications of gain-of-function influenza studies for pandemic preparedness and vaccine development.[11]
2013 (February 1) Scientific policy statement A group of influenza researchers including Ron Fouchier, Adolfo García-Sastre, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka publish a statement in Science announcing the resumption of transmission studies on avian influenza following a voluntary pause in gain-of-function research.[12]
2013 (May) Scientific experiment A research team led by Hualan Chen at China's Harbin Veterinary Research Institute publishes experiments showing that hybrid influenza viruses combining genes from H5N1 and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain can transmit between guinea pigs via respiratory droplets.[13]
2013 (May) Experiments A research group led by Hualan Chen at China's National Avian Influenza Reference Laboratory publishes findings from experiments conducted at the BSL3+ laboratory of the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute. They investigate the effects of a 2009 H1N1 infection combined with avian H5N1. The study finds that certain gene combinations in the dual-infection scenario can facilitate H5N1 transmission in mammals, but the modified viruses are less lethal.
2013 (May) Reactions Critics, including Simon Wain-Hobson and Robert May, condem Chen's research as unsafe and unnecessary. Concerns are raised about the biosafety of the laboratory, while others, including WHO's Masato Tashiro and Jeremy Farrar, praise the laboratory's standards and the study's insights into the H5N1 threat.
2013 (July 12) Scientific profile Science publishes a profile of virologist Hualan Chen and her work on avian influenza viruses, including research on hybrid influenza strains and their potential implications for cross-species transmission.[14]
2014 (May) Policy report The German Ethics Council presents a report to the Bundestag recommending governance measures for gain-of-function research and proposing national legislation regulating dual-use research of concern (DURC).[15]
2014 (May) Policy recommendation The German Ethics Council proposes a national code of conduct for life-science researchers to define acceptable and unacceptable experiments involving potentially dangerous pathogens and to promote biosecurity oversight.[16]
2014 (June 19) Biosafety incident The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that approximately 75 laboratory workers may have been exposed to live anthrax after samples were improperly inactivated, contributing to heightened scrutiny of laboratory biosafety practices.[17]
2014 (July 8) Biosafety incident Six vials containing viable smallpox virus are discovered in a storage box at a U.S. laboratory, raising additional concerns about laboratory oversight of dangerous pathogens.[18]
2014 (July 14) Policy statement The Cambridge Working Group publishes a consensus statement signed by 18 founding members including Amir Attaran, Barry Bloom, Arturo Casadevall, Richard H. Ebright, Alison Galvani, Thomas Inglesby, Michael Osterholm, David Relman, Richard Roberts, Marcel Salathé, and Silja Vöneky. The statement calls for a pause on experiments involving potential pandemic pathogens until their risks and benefits can be quantitatively assessed.[19][20]
2014 (August 13) Public debate Virologist W. Paul Duprex discusses the debate over gain-of-function experiments in an interview with NPR, arguing that recent laboratory safety incidents were exceptions and should not justify halting biomedical research on dangerous pathogens.[21]
2014 (August 15) Biosafety incident The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports a laboratory mix-up involving H5N1 avian influenza samples that were mistakenly shipped after contamination with another influenza strain.[22]
2014 (September 5) Scientific debate Prominent virologists including Constance Cepko, Dickson Despommier, Erica Ollmann Saphire, Geoffrey Smith, Karla Kirkegaard, Sean Whelan, Vincent Racaniello, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka sign statements supporting continued gain-of-function research under appropriate biosafety conditions. W. Ian Lipkin signs both the pro- and cautionary statements and calls for reconciliation between the opposing viewpoints.[23]
2014 (October 17) Policy decision The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the United States Department of Health and Human Services announce a funding pause and moratorium on certain gain-of-function experiments involving influenza, MERS, and SARS viruses while regulatory frameworks are reviewed.[24][25][26]
2014 (September) Policy guideline publication The National Institutes of Health publishes Tools for the Identification, Assessment, Management, and Responsible Communication of Dual Use Research of Concern, providing guidance for identifying and managing DURC in the United States.[27]
2014 (May 7) Policy debate The German Ethics Council calls for stronger government regulation of potentially dangerous life sciences research, including dual-use biological research.[28]
2014 (July 8) Biosafety incident Six vials containing viable smallpox virus from the 1950s are discovered at the Food and Drug Administration laboratory at White Oak, raising concerns about laboratory biosafety and oversight of dangerous pathogens.[29]
2014 (July 11) Biosafety incident report The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention releases a report detailing the accidental exposure of personnel to viable anthrax at the CDC’s Roybal Campus laboratory.[30]
2014 (July 15) Scientific warning Scientists call for limits on the creation of potentially dangerous pathogens following several biosafety incidents involving laboratories in the United States.[31]
2014 (December 12) Policy advocacy Advocacy efforts by the Cambridge Working Group contribute to the U.S. government's decision to impose a moratorium on federal funding for certain gain-of-function experiments involving potential pandemic pathogens.[32]
2014 (December 12) Policy decision The United States government grants exceptions to the ongoing moratorium on certain gain-of-function research projects, allowing 7 of the 18 affected studies to proceed under specific conditions.[33]
2014 (December) Academic symposium The National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine organize a two-day international symposium titled Gain-of-Function Research: A Symposium to discuss the potential risks and benefits of gain-of-function experiments. Participants include scientists and policymakers such as George F. Gao, Gabriel Leung, Michael Selgelid, Baruch Fischhoff, Alta Charo, Harvey V. Fineberg, Jonathan D. Moreno, Ralph Cicerone, Margaret Hamburg, Jo Handelsman, Samuel L. Stanley, Kenneth Berns, Ralph Baric, Robert A. Lamb, Silja Vöneky, Keiji Fukuda, David Relman, and Marc Lipsitch.[34]
2014 Advocacy group formation The advocacy group Scientists for Science is formed by 37 signatories in response to the Cambridge Working Group statement, arguing that research on potentially dangerous pathogens can be conducted safely and is essential for understanding microbial diseases and developing prevention and treatments.[35]
2014–2015 Scientific advocacy Members of Scientists for Science, including W. Paul Duprex, advocate continued gain-of-function research under strict biosafety regulations and argue that improving laboratory safety and oversight is preferable to restricting certain types of experiments.[36][37]
2015 Policy workshop summary publication The National Research Council and Institute of Medicine publish Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop, examining scientific benefits, risks, and governance considerations surrounding gain-of-function experiments.[38]
2015 (April 1) Scientific publication A paper in Health Security discusses public engagement and governance mechanisms for gain-of-function research, emphasizing transparency and stakeholder involvement in decision-making.[39]
2015 Scientific correspondence Founders of the Cambridge Working Group and Scientists for Science publish letters outlining their positions on gain-of-function experiments and emphasizing the need for public education and open dialogue about the risks and benefits of research involving potential pandemic pathogens.[36]
2015 (September 8) Scientific publication Researchers including Marc Lipsitch, Kevin Esvelt, and Thomas Inglesby publish an article in the Annals of Internal Medicine arguing that calls for caution in genome engineering should serve as a model for broader public dialogue on research involving potential pandemic pathogens.[40]
2015 (October) Scientific policy report The European Academies Science Advisory Council publishes Gain of function: experimental applications relating to potentially pandemic pathogens, examining risks and governance of gain-of-function research.[41]
2015 (October 16) Scientific policy report The European Academies Science Advisory Council publishes a report concluding that several European countries already possess sufficient laws, regulations, and codes of conduct to responsibly oversee gain-of-function research involving potentially pandemic pathogens.[42]
2016 Ethical analysis publication A paper in Science and Engineering Ethics analyzes the ethical dimensions of gain-of-function research, including biosafety, biosecurity, and governance considerations for experiments involving potentially pandemic pathogens.[43]
2016 (March 10–11) Academic symposium The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hold a second public symposium titled Gain-of-Function Research: A Second Symposium to discuss potential U.S. government policies for oversight of gain-of-function research and gather feedback from the life sciences community and the public.[44]
2016 (May) Policy recommendation The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity publishes Recommendations for the Evaluation and Oversight of Proposed Gain-of-Function Research, outlining criteria for assessing research involving potential pandemic pathogens.[45]
2016 (June 20) Policy analysis A report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine examines the possibility of developing coordinated policy approaches between the European Union and the United States for oversight of gain-of-function research and other dual-use life-science activities.[46]
2017 (January 9) Policy framework The United States Department of Health and Human Services releases the Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) framework, establishing federal procedures for reviewing and regulating research involving potential pandemic pathogens.[47]
2017 (August 18) Policy discussion The National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy publishes a blog post discussing stakeholder engagement and institutional responsibilities under U.S. policies governing dual-use research of concern (DURC).[48]
2017 (September 14) Policy analysis publication The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine publishes The Current Policy Environment, describing oversight structures and governance mechanisms for dual-use research of concern (DURC).[49]
2017 (December 19) Policy decision The National Institutes of Health lifts the U.S. gain-of-function research funding pause after the adoption of the P3CO review framework, stating that such research is important for understanding and countering emerging pathogens.[50]
2018 (June 5) Governance proposal Researchers discuss proposals by the German Research Foundation and the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina to expand the role of research ethics committees so that they also review proposals involving dual-use research of concern.[51]
2018 (February 1) Policy analysis A report in The Lancet Infectious Diseases discusses the end of the U.S. moratorium on certain gain-of-function studies and the broader debate surrounding research on potential pandemic pathogens.[52]
2018 (December 14) Government report The European Commission publishes a report to the European Parliament and Council on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, covering export controls and governance of dual-use technologies.[53]
2019 (September) Policy research publication A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute examines emerging dual-use technologies in life sciences and provides policy recommendations regarding export control and governance.[54]
2020 (January) Policy review The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity convenes an expert panel to revisit policies governing gain-of-function experiments and improve clarity regarding review procedures and public disclosure requirements.[55][56]
2020 (May 12) Scientific statement Scientists publicly state that there is “exactly zero” evidence that SARS-CoV-2 originated from a laboratory, rejecting claims linking the virus to gain-of-function research.[57]
2021 (January) Scientific commentary University of Saskatchewan virologist Angela Rasmussen publishes an analysis in Nature Medicine arguing that claims linking SARS-CoV-2 to gain-of-function laboratory research are unlikely given the oversight and scrutiny governing such experiments.[58]
2021 (June 20) Public debate A report in The New York Times highlights renewed debate over gain-of-function research during investigations into the origins of COVID-19, bringing increased attention to biosafety risks and scientific governance.[59]
2021 (May 11) Congressional hearing During a U.S. Senate hearing, Senator Rand Paul accuses the National Institutes of Health of funding gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Anthony Fauci responds that the NIH had not funded gain-of-function research at the laboratory.[60]
2021 (May 18) Fact-check analysis The Washington Post fact-checking team evaluates the Paul–Fauci exchange and concludes that Senator Paul's claims contained significant omissions or exaggerations regarding NIH funding and gain-of-function research.[60][61]
2021 (May 21) Scientific debate Experts including Richard Ebright and Alina Chan publicly debate whether experiments funded through the EcoHealth Alliance involving bat coronaviruses would qualify as gain-of-function research under the U.S. 2014 moratorium.[62]
2021 (June 20) Scientific policy debate A report in The New York Times highlights renewed scientific debate about biosafety, transparency, and gain-of-function research during investigations into the origins of COVID-19.[63]
2022 (October 14) Preprint Researchers at Boston University publish a preprint describing experiments where they spliced the SARS-CoV-2 BA.1 Omicron spike protein into an early SARS-CoV-2 variant. This creates a chimeric virus. The study reports higher mortality in mice exposed to the chimeric variant compared to those exposed to Omicron, suggesting mutations outside of spike proteins are significant determinants of pathogenicity.
2022 (October 17) Media Coverage The Daily Mail publishes an article with the headline Boston University CREATES a new COVID strain that has an 80% kill rate, linking the research to fears of pandemic origins. The headline is later flagged for misinformation. Experts note the study was conducted following safety procedures and emphasize that the chimeric strain is less lethal than the original virus. Controversy also arise over whether the research requires additional gain-of-function review.

Meta information on the timeline

How the timeline was built

The initial version of the timeline was written by Sebastian.

Funding information for this timeline is available.

Feedback and comments

Feedback for the timeline can be provided at the following places:

  • FIXME

What the timeline is still missing

Timeline update strategy

See also

References

  1. ↑ Osterhaus, A. D.; Rimmelzwaan, G. F.; Martina, B. E.; Bestebroer, T. M.; Fouchier, R. A. (2000-05-12). "Influenza B virus in seals". Science. 288 (5468): 1051–1053. Bibcode:2000Sci...288.1051O. doi:10.1126/science.288.5468.1051. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 10807575.
  2. ↑ Competing Responsibilities?: Addressing the Security Risks of Biological Research in Academia (PDF). American Association for the Advancement of Science. 20 January 2010. Archived (PDF) from the original on 5 October 2022. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  3. ↑ "Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)". World Health Organization. Archived from the original on October 29, 2013. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  4. ↑ "WHO | Responsible life sciences research for global health security". World Health Organization. Archived from the original on October 20, 2014.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Imai, Masaki; Watanabe, Tokiko; Hatta, Masato; Das, Subash C.; Ozawa, Makoto; Shinya, Kyoko; Zhong, Gongxun; Hanson, Anthony; Katsura, Hiroaki; Watanabe, Shinji; Li, Chengjun; Kawakami, Eiryo; Yamada, Shinya; Kiso, Maki; Suzuki, Yasuo; Maher, Eileen A.; Neumann, Gabriele; Kawaoka, Yoshihiro (2012). "Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets". Nature. 486 (7403): 420–428. Bibcode:2012Natur.486..420I. doi:10.1038/nature10831. PMC 3388103. PMID 22722205.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Schrauwen, Eefje J. A.; Herfst, Sander; Leijten, Lonneke M.; van Run, Peter; Bestebroer, Theo M.; Linster, Martin; Bodewes, Rogier; Kreijtz, Joost H. C. M.; Rimmelzwaan, Guus F.; Osterhaus, Albert D. M. E.; Fouchier, Ron A. M.; Kuiken, Thijs; van Riel, Debby (April 2012). "The multibasic cleavage site in H5N1 virus is critical for systemic spread along the olfactory and hematogenous routes in ferrets". Journal of Virology. 86 (7): 3975–3984. doi:10.1128/JVI.06828-11. ISSN 1098-5514. PMC 3302532. PMID 22278228.
  7. ↑ "Opinion An Engineered Doomsday". The New York Times. 2012-01-07. Archived from the original on 2023-03-26. Retrieved 2021-05-29.
  8. ↑ "Report on technical consultation on H5N1 research issues". World Health Organization. February 2012.
  9. ↑ Herfst, Sander; Schrauwen, Eefje J. A.; Linster, Martin; Chutinimitkul, Salin; de Wit, Emmie; Munster, Vincent J.; Sorrell, Erin M.; Bestebroer, Theo M.; Burke, David F.; Smith, Derek J.; Rimmelzwaan, Guus F.; Osterhaus, Albert D. M. E.; Fouchier, Ron A. M. (2012-06-22). "Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets". Science. 336 (6088): 1534–1541. Bibcode:2012Sci...336.1534H. doi:10.1126/science.1213362. ISSN 0036-8075. PMC 4810786. PMID 22723413.
  10. ↑ Patrone, Daniel; Resnik, David; Chin, Lisa (September 2012). "Biosecurity and the Review and Publication of Dual-Use Research of Concern". Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. 10 (3): 290–298. doi:10.1089/bsp.2012.0011. ISSN 1538-7135. PMC 3440065. PMID 22871221.
  11. ↑ Belser, Jessica A.; Tumpey, Terrence M. (2013-12-05). "H5N1 pathogenesis studies in mammalian models". Virus Research. 178 (1): 168–185. doi:10.1016/j.virusres.2013.02.003. ISSN 1872-7492. PMC 5858902. PMID 23458998.
  12. ↑ Fouchter, Ron A. M.; García-Sastre, Adolfo; Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; Barclay, Wendy S.; Bouvier, Nicole M.; Brown, Ian H.; Capua, Ilaria; Chen, Hualan; Compans, Richard W.; Couch, Robert B.; Cox, Nancy J.; Doherty, Peter C.; Donis, Ruben O.; Feldmann, Heinz; Guan, Yi; Katz, Jacqueline M.; Kiselev, Oleg I.; Klenk, H. D.; Kobinger, Gary; Liu, Jinhua; Liu, Xiufan; Lowen, Anice; Mettenletter, Thomas C.; Osterhaus, Albert D. M. E.; Palese, Peter; Petris, J. S. Malik; Perez, Daniel R.; Richt, Jürgen A.; Schultz-Cherry, Stacey; STteel, John; Subbarao, Kanta; Swayne, David E.; Takimoto, Toru; Tashiro, Masato; Taubenberger, Jeffrey K.; Thomas, Paul G.; Tripp, Ralph A.; Tumpey, Terrence M.; Webby, Richard J.; Webster, Robert G (2013-02-01). "Transmission Studies Resume For Avian Flu". Science. 339 (6119): 520–521. Bibcode:2013Sci...339..520F. doi:10.1126/science.1235140. ISSN 0036-8075. PMC 3838856. PMID 23345603.
  13. ↑ Zhang, Y.; Zhang, Q.; Kong, H.; Jiang, Y.; Gao, Y.; Deng, G.; Shi, J.; Tian, G.; Liu, L.; Liu, J.; Guan, Y.; Bu, Z.; Chen, H. (2013). "H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes Transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet". Science. 340 (6139): 1459–1463. Bibcode:2013Sci...340.1459Z. doi:10.1126/science.1229455. PMID 23641061. S2CID 206544849.
  14. ↑ Hvistendahl, Mara (2013-07-12). "Veterinarian-in-Chief". Science. 341 (6142): 122–125. Bibcode:2013Sci...341..122H. doi:10.1126/science.341.6142.122. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 23846887. Archived from the original on 2021-09-23. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  15. ↑ Lev, Ori (2019-09-01). "Regulating dual-use research: Lessons from Israel and the United States". Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity. 1 (2): 80–85. doi:10.1016/j.jobb.2019.06.001. ISSN 2588-9338.
  16. ↑ "Biosecurity – freedom and responsibility of research" (PDF). German Ethics Council. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 April 2015. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  17. ↑ Sun, Lena H. (2014-06-19). "CDC says about 75 scientists may have been exposed to anthrax". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 2021-10-07. Retrieved 2021-07-19.
  18. ↑ Kaiser, Jocelyn (2014-07-08). "Six vials of smallpox discovered in U.S. lab". Science | AAAS. Archived from the original on 2021-11-06. Retrieved 2021-07-19.
  19. ↑ Husbands, Jo L. (September 2018). "The challenge of framing for efforts to mitigate the risks of "dual use" research in the life sciences". Futures. 102: 104–113. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2018.03.007. ISSN 0016-3287. PMC 7094442. PMID 32226095.
  20. ↑ "The Cambridge Working Group". Cambridgeworkinggroup.org. Archived from the original on 26 May 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  21. ↑ Greenfieldboyce, Nell (13 August 2014). "Biologists Choose Sides In Safety Debate Over Lab-Made Pathogens". NPR. Archived from the original on 2021-05-07. Retrieved 2021-05-07. There are multiple events that have come together in a rather unusual convergence," says Paul Duprex, a microbiologist at Boston University. He sees the recent reports of lab mistakes as exceptions — they don't mean you should shut down basic science that's essential to protecting public health, he says."These viruses are out there. They cause disease; they have killed many, many people in the past," Duprex says. "We bring them to the laboratory to work with them.
  22. ↑ Kaiser, Jocelyn (2014-08-15). "CDC explains mix-up with deadly H5N1 avian flu". Science | AAAS. Archived from the original on 2021-11-07. Retrieved 2021-07-19.
  23. ↑ "Science Magazine - 05 September 2014 - page20". www.sciencemagazinedigital.org. Archived from the original on 2021-08-02. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  24. ↑ "U.S. Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process and Research Funding Pause on Selected Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, MERS, and SARS Viruses" (PDF). U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 17 October 2014.
  25. ↑ McNeil, Donald G. Jr. (17 October 2014). "White House to Cut Funding for Risky Biological Study". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 7 February 2021. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  26. ↑ Kaiser, Jocelyn; Malakoff, David (17 October 2014). "U.S. halts funding for new risky virus studies, calls for voluntary moratorium". Science. 346 (6208): 404. doi:10.1126/science.346.6208.404. PMID 25342775. Archived from the original on 22 October 2021. Retrieved 28 July 2016.
  27. ↑ Tools for the Identification, Assessment, Management, and Responsible Communication of Dual Use Research of Concern (PDF). Prepared by the National Institutes of Health on behalf of the United States Government. September 2014. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 March 2023. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  28. ↑ Enserink, Martin (2014-05-07). "German Ethics Council: Government Should Regulate Dangerous Research". Science. Archived from the original on 2023-03-13. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  29. ↑ Kaiser, Jocelyn (8 July 2014). "Six vials of smallpox discovered in U.S. lab". Science. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  30. ↑ "Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax" (PDF). CDC. 11 July 2014. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 June 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  31. ↑ "Scientists call for limit on creating dangerous pathogens". Science. July 15, 2014. Archived from the original on June 29, 2022. Retrieved June 30, 2022.
  32. ↑ Lipsitch, Marc; Inglesby, Thomas V. (December 12, 2014). "Moratorium on Research Intended To Create Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens". mBio. 5 (6) e02366-14. doi:10.1128/mBio.02366-14. PMC 4271556. PMID 25505122.
  33. ↑ "Summary Report – Dual Use Research on Microbes: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Responsibility" (PDF). Volkswagen Foundation. 12 December 2014. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 February 2021. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  34. ↑ "Gain-of-Function Research: A Symposium". National Academies. Archived from the original on 2021-02-10. Retrieved 2021-02-05.
  35. ↑ Edelmann, Achim; Moody, James; Light, Ryan (2017-05-24). "Disparate foundations of scientists' policy positions on contentious biomedical research". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 114 (24): 6262–6267. Bibcode:2017PNAS..114.6262E. doi:10.1073/pnas.1613580114. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 5474814. PMID 28559310.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Duprex, W. Paul; Fouchier, Ron A. M.; Imperiale, Michael J.; Lipsitch, Marc; Relman, David A. (2015). "Gain-of-function experiments: time for a real debate". Nature Reviews Microbiology. 13 (January 2015) (published 2014-12-08): 58–64. doi:10.1038/nrmicro3405. ISSN 1740-1534. PMC 7097416. PMID 25482289.
  37. ↑ "Scientists for Science". www.scientistsforscience.org. Archived from the original on 17 May 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2021. In recognition of this need, significant resources have been invested globally to build and operate BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities, and to mitigate risk in a variety of ways, involving regulatory requirements, facility engineering, and training. Ensuring that these facilities operate safely and are staffed effectively so that risk is minimized is our most important line of defense, as opposed to limiting the types of experiments that are done.
  38. ↑ Frances Sharples; Jo Husbands; Anne-Marie Mazza; Audrey Thevenon; India Hook-Barnard (2015). "Potential Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research". Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. National Research Council and Institute of Medicine. Bibcode:2015nap..book21666I. doi:10.17226/21666. ISBN 978-0-309-36783-7. PMID 25719185. Archived from the original on 2022-10-11. Retrieved 2021-05-16.
  39. ↑ Schoch-Spana, Monica (April 1, 2015). "Public Engagement and the Governance of Gain-of-Function Research". Health Security. 13 (2): 69–73. doi:10.1089/hs.2015.0005. PMC 4394177. PMID 25813979.
  40. ↑ Lipsitch, Marc; Esvelt, Kevin; Inglesby, Thomas (2015-09-08). "Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research". Annals of Internal Medicine. 163 (10): 790–791. doi:10.7326/M15-1048. ISSN 0003-4819. PMID 26344802. S2CID 37616990. Archived from the original on 2022-09-17. Retrieved 29 May 2021.
  41. ↑ Gain of function: experimental applications relating to potentially pandemic pathogens (PDF). European Academies Science Advisory Council. October 2015. ISBN 978-3-8047-3481-4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2023-03-30. Retrieved 2021-05-16.
  42. ↑ "Gain of Function: experimental applications relating to potentially pandemic pathogens". easac.eu. 2015-10-16.
  43. ↑ Selgelid, M. J. (2016). "Gain-of-Function Research: Ethical Analysis". Science and Engineering Ethics. 22 (4): 923–964. doi:10.1007/s11948-016-9810-1. PMC 4996883. PMID 27502512.
  44. ↑ Board On Life Sciences; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Health Sciences Policy; Health And Medicine Division; Committee on Science, Technology, and Law; Policy And Global Affairs; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (March 2016). Millett, Piers; Husbands, Jo; Sharples, Frances; Thevenon, Audrey (eds.). Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of the Second Symposium (PDF). doi:10.17226/23484. ISBN 978-0-309-44077-6. PMID 27403489. Archived (PDF) from the original on December 29, 2020. Retrieved January 29, 2021.
  45. ↑ "RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EVALUATION AND OVERSIGHT OF PROPOSED GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH" (PDF). United States Department of Health and Human Services. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. May 2016. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 January 2017.
  46. ↑ International Policy. National Academies Press (US). 20 June 2016. Archived from the original on 8 November 2022. Retrieved 16 May 2021.
  47. ↑ "Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO)" (PDF). Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 9 January 2017. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 March 2023. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  48. ↑ "The Deep Dish on Institutional DURC Policy: Calling All Stakeholders!". Office of Science Policy. Archived from the original on 26 May 2021. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  49. ↑ The Current Policy Environment. National Academies Press (US). 2017-09-14. Archived from the original on 2023-03-13. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  50. ↑ Collins, Francis S. (19 December 2017). "NIH Lifts Funding Pause on Gain-of-Function Research". Director, National Institutes of Health. Archived from the original on 17 April 2020. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  51. ↑ Salloch, Sabine (2018-06-05). "The dual use of research ethics committees: why professional self-governance falls short in preserving biosecurity". BMC Medical Ethics. 19 (1) 53. doi:10.1186/s12910-018-0295-0. ISSN 1472-6939. PMC 5989368. PMID 29871633.
  52. ↑ Burki, Talha (2018-02-01). "Ban on gain-of-function studies ends". The Lancet Infectious Diseases. 18 (2): 148–149. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30006-9. ISSN 1473-3099. PMC 7128689. PMID 29412966.
  53. ↑ REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (PDF). Brussels: European Commission. 14 December 2018. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 May 2021. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  54. ↑ Himmel, Mirko (September 2019). "Emerging Dual-use Technologies in the Life Sciences: Challenges and Policy Recommendations on Export Control SIPRI". www.sipri.org. 64. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  55. ↑ Subbaraman, Nidhi (2020-01-27). "US officials revisit rules for disclosing risky disease experiments". Nature. Nature News. doi:10.1038/d41586-020-00210-5. Archived from the original on 2023-01-03. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
  56. ↑ Kaiser, Jocelyn (24 January 2020). "After criticism, federal officials to revisit policy for reviewing risky virus experiments". Science. Archived from the original on 21 October 2022. Retrieved 30 October 2021.
  57. ↑ Van Beusekom, Mary (12 May 2020). "Scientists: 'Exactly zero' evidence COVID-19 came from a lab". CIDRAP. Archived from the original on 1 February 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  58. ↑ Rasmussen A (2021). "On the origins of SARS-CoV-2". Nature Medicine. 27 (9): 9. doi:10.1038/s41591-020-01205-5. PMID 33442004. S2CID 231606580.
  59. ↑ Zimmer, Carl; Gorman, James (20 June 2021). "Fight Over Covid's Origins Renews Debate on Risks of Lab Work - Talk of 'gain-of-function' research, a muddy category at best, brings up deep questions about how scientists should study viruses and other pathogens". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 27 January 2022. Retrieved 20 June 2021.
  60. ↑ 60.0 60.1 "Analysis - Fact-checking the Paul-Fauci flap over Wuhan lab funding". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 6 July 2021. Retrieved 13 July 2021.
  61. ↑ Kessler, Glenn. "About The Fact Checker". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 19 October 2015. Retrieved 13 July 2021.
  62. ↑ Robertson, Lori (21 May 2021). "The Wuhan Lab and the Gain-of-Function Disagreement". FactCheck.org. Archived from the original on 8 June 2021. Retrieved 14 July 2021.
  63. ↑ Zimmer, Carl; Gorman, James (20 June 2021). "Fight Over Covid's Origins Renews Debate on Risks of Lab Work". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 14 July 2021.
Retrieved from "https://timelines.issarice.com/index.php?title=Timeline_of_gain-of-function_research&oldid=89616"